Project on Adultery - Section 497

INTRODUCTION

Adultery means voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person other than with spouse. The legal definition of adultery however varies from country to country and statute to statute. While at many places adultery is when a woman has voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than her husband, at other places adultery is when a woman has voluntary sexual intercourse with a third person without her husband’s consent.

Though the modern trend is to decriminalize adultery, historically, many cultures have regarded adultery as a crime. Jewish, Islamic, Christian and Hindu traditions are all unequivocal in their condemnation of adultery. In most cultures both the man and the woman are equally punishable. However, according to ancient Hindu law, in ancient Greece and in Roman law, only the offending female spouse could be killed and men were not heavily punished.

In India the offence of adultery is punishable under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. As it stands, this Section makes only men having sexual intercourse with the wives of other men without the consent of their husbands punishable and women cannot be punished even as abettors. The Report of the Malimath Committee on Criminal Justice Reforms and the 42nd Report of the Law Commission of India recommended redefining Section 497 to make women also punishable for adultery. The Central Government accordingly has sought the views of all the 30 states in the country regarding the implementation of the said recommendations. This paper attempts to establish the redundancy of Section 497 in the light of Personal and Matrimonial laws and changing social conditions subsequently making a case against amending and for completely deleting Section 497 from the IPC.

According to Section 497 of Indian Penal Code, 1860,

Adultery is defined as “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.”

GENESIS

Adultery is one of the burning issues in India. It may not be a serious crime but it does play chaos in the lives of the people concerned. Our Indian society is more conserved and expects faithfulness & loyalty of an individual towards his or her spouse. A person who is committing an adulterous act is always aware of the fact that he or she is violating the basic norms of the institution of marriage & that of the society and credibility & trustworthiness is being targeted. The project is all about the effectiveness of the provision given in The Indian Penal Code, i.e. section 497 of IPC.

Adultery may not seem to be gravest of crimes but it does bring out some of the direct consequences. The individual committing adultery is always conscious of the fact that if somehow his/her partner will come to know of his/her liaison, he/she won’t take it calmly, indeed that person will have to face a lot of wrath & criticism by the family as well as the society. To be vigilant against such a result, the felonious party may instigate a fierce attack against his/her partner, resulting in a critical fault such as abduction or even murder. Considering Indian laws and the scenario of our society, adultery is definitely a crime in India. The project devolves around how Adultery is dealt with, in the present scenario and how it was in the past.

HYPOTHESIS

Whether the provision made is effective in the present scenario. Whether it is justified??

CONTENT ANALYSIS

In order to constitute the offence of adultery the following elements are essential :

ESSENTIALS OF ADULTERY


That the accused had sexual intercourse with the woman in question;
That she was the lawful married wife of another man;
That the accused knew or had reason to believe that she was the lawfully married wife of another man;
That the husband of the woman did not consent to or connive at such intercourse;
That the sexual intercourse so had did not amount to rape.

SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

A man having sexual intercourse with a married woman is an essential ingredient of the offence. So where the wife went over to the shop of the accused to have sexual intercourse, but was at once followed and entrapped, it was held that her act did not go beyond the stage of preparation and hence this section was not attracted. Similarly, when an accused was provided with a married woman to pass the night with, and before the accused could have sexual intercourse with the woman, the husband intervened and took her away, the accused was held not guilty under this section.

Though proof of sexual intercourse is essential for the offence of adultery, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. It has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case[1]. However, the circumstances must be of such a nature that they fairly infer that sexual intercourse took place[2]. Evidence of opportunities sought for and obtained and of undue familiarities, which point strongly to an inference of guilt, is sufficient to establish the fact of sexual intercourse[3]. The entire background and context of the case needs to be taken into consideration for ascertaining sexual intercourse[4].

WOMAN MUST BE MARRIED

The section indicts sexual intercourse by a man, who is the wife of another man. The factum of lawful marriage must be strictly proved. Sexual intercourse with a prostitute, an unmarried woman, a widow, therefore, does not amount to adultery under the IPC. Even sexual intercourse with a woman who lived with another man without marriage and has got children from him does not amount to adultery, as she is not ‘wife of another[5]’.

KNOWLEDGE

In order to be brought within the purview of this section, a man should not only have intercourse with a married woman, but he must also ‘know’ or have ‘reason to believe’ that such a woman is the ‘wife of another man’. This does not mean that he should know the identity of the husband. It is sufficient if he knows or has reason to believe that the woman is married. Such ‘reason to believe’ may arise from the fact that in the case of a Hindu woman, outward insignia of married life are exhibited by wearing mangalsutra, the application of kumkum in the parting of hair, use of bangles, toe rings, etc.

The prosecution should establish the presence of such knowledge or reasonable belief. It constitutes mens rea and the prosecution should place sufficient material before the court to prove that the accused had knowledge or reasonable belief that the woman was married.

CONSENT OR CONNIVANCE OF THE HUSBAND

Another requirement of law is that the adultery complained of has not been committed either with the consent or connivance of the husband. This is based on the principle of volenti non fit injuria, meaning ‘what is consented to cannot injure’.[6] Such consent can be express or implied. ‘Connivance’ is a figurative expression that indicates a voluntary blindness to some act or conduct, which is known to be going on without protest or desire to interfere with or to disturb. If the husband was fully aware of the fact that his wife was committing adultery but did not do anything to stop the same, then the adulterous relationship may be considered to have been committed with acquiescence[7], and therefore no offence can be said to have been committed. The absence or presence of consent or connivance can be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Strict proof of the same is not necessary.[8]

SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE RAPE

The offence of adultery by its very nature connoted that it is sexual intercourse between two consenting adults. The woman, although married, must be a willing partner to the sexual intercourse. However, if the accused has sexual intercourse without the consent of the woman, then it is a much more graver offence and it would amount to rape. Here, the consent or connivance of the husband is immaterial. Consent of the woman is primary. If her consent is absent, then it will amount to an act of rape, punishable under s 376 of the IPC.

Adultery is not an offence under the English Law, and some of the most celebrated English Lawyer have considered its omissions from the English Law to be a serious defect.
The cognizance of this offence is limited to adultery committed with a married woman, and the male offender alone had been made liable to punishment. Thus, under the Indian Penal Code, adultery an offence committed by a third person against a husband in respect of his wife. It is not committed by a man who has sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman, or with a widow, or divorced woman or even with a married woman whose husband consents to it.
It must be noted that wife can be punishable as an abettor. It is now felt that, with the advance of civilization, it would be more consonant with Indian ideals, if the woman also is punished for adultery.

DEFENCES AVAILABLE TO ACCUSED

The following defences are available to the accused of adultery-
There was not sexual intercourse.
The accused did not know the woman to be the wife of another;
The husband of the woman consented to or connived at the act of intercourse; or
The complainant was neither the husband of the woman nor any other person permitted to prefer such complaint under Cr.P.C.

The punishment for adultery is the imprisonment for five years, or fine or both.

BURDEN OF PROOF

It is very difficult to produce direct evidence to prove an act of adultery. Adultery is a matrimonial offence as well as a criminal offence. The requirement of proof in a criminal case is stricter than the requirement in a matrimonial case. In the former case the act is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the latter the evidence is based on the inferences and possibilities. Thus the offence of adultery may be proved by:
Circumstantial evidence
By evidence as to non-access and birth of a child
By evidence of visits to brothels
By contracting venereal diseases
Confession and admission to parties
Preponderance of probability

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Lord Macaulay did not deem it fit to put infidelity in his First Draft of the Indian Penal Code. Reviewing facts and opinions collected from all the three Presidencies about the feasibility of the criminalisation of adultery, he concluded:

"It seems to us that no advantage is to be expected from providing a punishment for adultery. The population seems to be divided into two classes - those whom neither the existing punishment nor any punishment which we should feel ourselves justified in proposing will satisfy, and those who consider the injury produced by adultery as one for which a pecuniary compensation will sufficiently atone. Those whose feelings of honour are painfully affected by the infidelity of their wives will not apply to the tribunals at all. Those whose feelings are less delicate will be satisfied by a payment of money. Under such circumstances, we think it best to treat adultery merely as a civil injury."

The Law Commissioners in their Second Report on the Draft Penal Code, however, took a different view. Disfavouring the Macaulian perception of adultery, but placing heavy reliance upon his remarks on the status of women in India, they concluded:

"While we think that the offence of adultery ought not to be omitted from the Code, we would limit its cognizance to adultery committed with a married woman, and considering that there is much weight in the last remark in Note 'Q', regarding the condition of the women in this country, in deference to it, we would render the male offender alone liable to punishment.” Section 497 of the Penal Code reflects the above perception.

Section 497 unequivocally conveys that the adulteress "wife" is absolutely free from criminal responsibility. She is also not to be punished (even) for "abetting" the offence. Section 497, by necessary implication, assumes that the "wife" was a hapless victim of adultery and not either a perpetrator or an accomplice thereof. Adultery, as viewed under IPC, is thus an offence against the husband of the adulteress wife and, thereby, an offence relating to "marriage".

It is in consonance with this approach that Section 198 CrPC mandates a court not to take cognizance of adultery unless the "aggrieved" husband makes a complaint. It runs as under:

"198. Prosecution for offences against marriage.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence punishable under Section 497 or Section 498 of the said Code: Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed may, with the leave of the court, make a complaint on his behalf."

Section 497 IPC read with Section 198 CrPC, thus signifies the unequal status of "husband" and "wife" in the institution of marriage in India. It declares that: (i) man is a seducer and the married woman is merely his hapless and passive victim, (ii) he trespasses upon another man's marital property i.e. his wife by establishing a sexual liaison with the married woman with her consent but without the consent or connivance[9] of her husband, (iii) husband of the adulteress wife is an aggrieved party and he (in some cases a person who had care of the married woman when the adultery was committed), therefore, is authorised to make a formal complaint, (iv) wife of the man, if he is married, who had consensual sexual intercourse with another woman, married or unmarried, is not deemed to be an aggrieved party and thereby is precluded from making a formal complaint against either her husband or the adulteress woman, and (v) a married man, with impunity, may seduce and establish sexual liaison with an unmarried woman, a widow, or a divorcee even though such a sexual link is equally potential to wreck the marriage between him and his wife[10].

RELATED CASES

Ø Muniraj Sahu vs Rambahor Sahu on 21 February, 2012

In this case, the respondent alleged that Bitti Bai(wife) though married with the respondent, was residing with applicant and a marriage took place between the applicant and Bitti Bai and therefore, he prosecuted a criminal case for offence punishable under Sections 495, 494 of I.P.C against Bitti Bai and applicant. The complaint filed by the respondent and divorce application filed by the respondent were dismissed by the Courts on the basis that the respondent could not prove the marriage of the applicant and wife of the respondent.

Ø W.Kalyani vs State TR.Inspector of Police & anr[11].

In this case, the appellant, though she is charged under Sections 497 of the Penal Code, she cannot be punished under it. The provision is currently under criticism from certain quarters for showing a strong gender bias for it makes the position of a married woman almost as a property of her husband. But in terms of the law as it stands, it is evident from a plain reading of the Section that only a man can be proceeded against and punished for the offence of adultery. Indeed, the Section provides expressly that the wife cannot be punished even as an abettor. Thus, the mere fact that the appellant is a woman makes her completely immune to the charge of adultery and she cannot be proceeded against for that offence

Ø V. Revathi by Thakkar J[12]

It was observed in this case: “The argument in support of the challenge is that whether or not the husband has the right to prosecute the disloyal wife, the wife must have the right to prosecute the disloyal husband. Admittedly under the law, the aggrieved husband whose wife has been disloyal to him has no right under the law to prosecute his wife, inasmuch as by the very definition of the offence, only a man can commit it, not a woman. The philosophy underlying the scheme of these provisions appears to be that as between the husband and the wife social goods will be promoted by permitting them to 'make up' or 'break up' the matrimonial tie rather than to drag each other to the criminal court. They can either condone the offence in a spirit of 'forgive and forget' and live together or separate by approaching a matrimonial court and snapping the matrimonial tie by securing divorce. They are not enabled to send each other to jail. Perhaps it is as well that the children (if any) are saved from the trauma of one of their parents being jailed at the instance of the other parent. Whether one does or does not subscribe to the wisdom or philosophy of these provisions is of little consequence. For, the court is not the arbiter of the wisdom or the philosophy of the law. It is the arbiter merely of the constitutionality of the law.”

Ø Earnest John White Vs Mrs. Kathleen Olive White and Others[13]

Husband filed dissolution of marriage on the ground of her adultery. Trial Court had granted the divorce and High Court had reversed the decree of divorce. Appeal before Supreme Court and Supreme Court held that: The wife went to Patna and stayed with respondent No. 2 under an assumed name. They occupied the same room, i.e., room No. 10. There was undoubtedly a guilty inclination and passion indicated by the conduct of respondent No. 2 and there is no contrary indication as to the inclination and conduct of the wife. As adultery has been proved the court allowed this appeal.

Ø Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar Vs Sunanda[14]

The appellant is husband of the respondent. On the petition filed by the respondent judicial separation on the ground of adultery on the part of the appellant a decree for judicial separation was passed by the High Court of Karnataka. In the said order the Court considering the petition filed by the respondent, ordered that the appellant shall pay as maintenance Rs.100/- per month to the wife and Rs.75/- per month for the daughter. Since then the order has not been complied with by the appellant and the respondent has not received any amount towards maintenance. Thereafter, the appellant presented a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of more than one year after passing of the decree for judicial separation.

The respondent contested the petition for divorce on the ground, inter alia, that the appellant having failed to pay the maintenance as ordered by the Court the petition for divorce filed by him is liable to be rejected as he is trying to take advantage of his own wrong for getting the relief. The High Court accepted the plea taken by the respondent and refused to grant the appellants prayer for divorce. The said order is assailed by the appellant in this appeal by special leave

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY

Immediately after the commencement of the Constitution of India, Section 497 IPC was assailed on the ground that it goes against the spirit of equality embodied in the Constitution.

In 1951, one Mr Yusuf Abdul Aziz, charged with adultery, contended before the Bombay High Court that Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional as it, in contravention of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution[15], operates unequally between a man and a woman by making only the former responsible for adultery. It, thereby, he argued, discriminates in favour of women and against men only on the ground of sex.

Recalling the historical background of Section 497 and the then prevailing social conditions and the sexual mores oppressive to women, and the unequal status of women, the High Court of Bombay upheld the constitutional validity of the provision. Chagla, C.J., observed:

"What led to this discrimination in this country is not the fact that women had a sex different from that of men, but that women in this country were so situated that special legislation was required in order to protect them, and it was from this point of view that one finds in Section 497 a position in law which takes a sympathetic and charitable view of the weakness of women in this country." The Court also opined that the alleged discrimination in favour of women was saved by the provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution which permits the State to make "any special provision for women and children".

Yusuf Abdul[16], on appeal to the Supreme Court argued that Section 497, by assuming that the offence of adultery could only be committed by a man and mandating a court that the adulteress wife be not punished even as an abettor, offended the spirit of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Such an immunity assured to the adulteress wife (even) for her willing participation in the adulterous sexual activity, it was argued, did amount to a sort of licence to her to commit and abet the offence of adultery.

Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Constitutional Bench (comprising M.C. Mahajan, C.J., Mukherjea, S.R. Das and Ghulam Hasan, JJ.) was not impressed by the appellant's interpretation of Section 497 as well as of Articles 14 and 15. His Lordship, like Chagla, C.J., relying heavily upon Article 15(3), held that Section 497 is a special provision made for women and therefore is saved by clause (3) of Article 15. To the argument that Article 15(3) should be confined only to provisions which are beneficial to women and should not be used to give them a licence to commit and abet a crime with impunity, the Apex Court responded:

"We are unable to read any such restriction into the clause; nor are we able to agree that a provision which prohibits punishment is tantamount to a licence to commit the offence of which punishment has been prohibited."

More than three decades after the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Yusuf Abdul Aziz case[17], constitutional vires of Section 497 came to be reagitated in Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India[18]. It was contended that Section 497, being contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution, makes an irrational classification between women and men as it: (i) confers upon the husband the right to prosecute the adulterer but it does not confer a corresponding right upon the wife to prosecute the woman with whom her husband has committed adultery, (ii) does not confer any right on the wife to prosecute the husband who has committed adultery with another woman, and (iii) does not take in its ambit the cases where the husband has sexual relations with unmarried women, with the result that the husbands have a free licence under the law to have extramarital relationship with unmarried women.

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and ruled that Section 497 does not offend either Article 14 or Article 15 of the Constitution. The Apex Court also brushed aside the argument that Section 497, in the changed social "transformation" in feminine attitudes and status of the woman in a marriage, is a flagrant instance of "gender discrimination", "legislative despotism" and "male chauvinism", by opining that it is for the legislature to take note of such a "transformation" while making appropriate amendments to Section 497. The argument that Section 497 is a kind of "romantic paternalism" premised on the traditional assumption that a woman, like a chattel, is the property of man, was also rejected by the Court.

The woman petitioner also argued that the right to life, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the recent past, includes the right to reputation and the absence in Section 497 of the provision mandating the court to hear the married woman with whom the accused has allegedly committed adultery violates her constitutional right to life under Article 21. Assuming that the right to be heard is concomitant with the principles of natural justice and believing that a trial court allows the married woman to depose her say before it records adverse findings against her, the Apex Court held that the absence of a provision mandating hearing the adulteress wife in Section 497 does not make the section unconstitutional.

However, one may find it difficult to convince himself about the rationale of the disability of the "wife" of the adulterer to prosecute her unfaithful husband. In V. Revathi v. Union of India[19] this disability was relied upon by a wife to challenge the constitutional propriety of Section 198(2) read with Section 198(1) CrPC, which, as mentioned earlier, empower the husband of the adulteress wife to prosecute the adulterer but does not permit the wife of an adulterer to prosecute her promiscuous husband. Probably realising that the section also does not permit the husband of the adulteress wife to prosecute her for her infidelity and recalling the ratio of Sowmithri Vishnu case, she asserted that whether or not the law permits the husband to prosecute his disloyal wife, the wife cannot be lawfully disabled from prosecuting her unfaithful husband. Such a statutory provision, which is premised on gender discrimination in contravention of the gender equality guaranteed in the Constitution, is, the petitioner wife argued, unconstitutional as it amounts to an "obnoxious discrimination".

Upholding the constitutionality of Section 497 IPC and Section 198(2) CrPC, which according to the Court "go hand in hand and constitute a legislative packet" to deal with "an outsider" to the matrimonial unit who invades the peace and privacy of the matrimonial unit, Thakkar, J. of the Apex Court observed:

"The community punishes the 'outsider' who breaks into the matrimonial home and occasions the violation of sanctity of the matrimonial tie by developing an illicit relationship with one of the spouses subject to the rider that the erring 'man' alone can be punished and not the erring woman. ... There is thus reverse discrimination in 'favour' of the woman rather than 'against' her. The law does not envisage the punishment of any of the spouses at the instance of each other. Thus there is no discrimination against the woman insofar as she is not permitted to prosecute her husband. A husband is not permitted because the wife is not treated as an offender in the eye of law. The wife is not permitted as Section 198(1) read with Section 198(2) does not permit her to do so. In the ultimate analysis the law has meted out even-handed justice to both of them in the matter of prosecuting each other or securing the incarceration of each other."[20]

The constitutional validity of Section 497 is upheld ostensibly on the impression that it is favourable to the woman as it keeps her out of the purview of criminal law. Such an approach is predominantly premised on a set of moot assumptions pertaining to female sexuality and the inability of the higher judiciary to appreciate current social "transformation". The Court, time and again, asserted that it is for the legislature to take cognizance of the social "transformation" and not for it.

It is obvious that no adultery can be committed unless a woman is a consenting partner. The judicial perception that only a man can be "an outsider", who has potential to invade the peace and privacy of the matrimonial unit and to poison the relationship between the unfaithful wife and her husband, therefore, seems to be, with due respect, less convincing and unrealistic. "An outsider woman", can, like "an outsider man", be equally capable of "invading" the matrimonial peace and privacy as well as of "poisoning" the relationship of not only her own matrimonial home but also that of her paramour. Similarly, the judicial opinion that Section 198(1) read with Section 198(2) CrPC, disqualifying the wife of an unfaithful husband for prosecuting him for his promiscuous behaviour, with due respect, is unconvincing and illogical.

Such judicial reasoning, in ultimate analysis, unfortunately endorses the patriarchal, property-oriented and gender-discriminatory penal law of adultery. It conveys that a man is entitled to have exclusive possession of, and access to, his wife's sexuality, and a woman is not eligible to have such an exclusive right and claim over her husband. She is, therefore, not entitled to prosecute either her promiscuous husband or the "outsider woman" who has poisoned (or helped her promiscuous husband to do so) her matrimonial home. The Apex Court, thus, failed to have a deeper insight into the law of adultery.

CONCLUSION

In most of the foreign jurisdictions, adultery, apart from being a ground for divorce, has been perceived as a criminal wrong against marriage. Similarly, in these jurisdictions, both the spouses are generally held criminally responsible for their extramarital sexual intimacy.

However, the penal law of adultery in India is premised on the one-and-a-half century old caste-based stratified "social setting" in the context of the traditional conservative property-oriented familial ideology and sexual mores. It is also premised on a few outdated and moot assumptions of sexuality, sexual agency and unequal mutual marital rights and obligations of the spouses. It, in ultimate analysis, unmistakably intends to protect the rights of the husband and not of the wife. It is also bridled with deep-rooted obsolete assumptions predominantly premised on gender discrimination and the wife's sexuality. Such a law in the 21st century undoubtedly seems to be inconsistent with the modern notions of the status of women and the constitutional spirit of gender equality. During the post-IPC period, a number of Acts have been enacted to relieve women from the hitherto traditional system of seclusion and subordination and to assure them a status equal to men in every walk of life.

The existing gender discriminatory penal law of adultery, against this backdrop, deserves a serious relook and revision to the effect that a person, male or female, who, being married, has sexual intercourse with a female or a male (as the case may be) not his or her spouses without the consent or connivance of such spouses be made criminally responsible. Similarly, the spouse of the errant spouse be allowed not only to seek divorce from the other life partner but also to initiate legal proceedings with a view to fixing criminal liability of the "outsider" for wrecking the marriage. The latest proposals for reform of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Law Commissions of India deserve serious and immediate attention of the legislature. Such changes are required to translate the contemporary "social transformation" assuring equality to women and the constitutional spirit of gender equality into a reality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Net sources

· www.wikipedia.org

· www.vakilno1.com

· www.indiankanoon.org

· airwebworld.com

· www.legalserviceindia.com

Books referred

· Criminal Law by PSA Pillai, 10th edition

Statutes referred
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

[1] Kashuri v Ramaswamy (1979) Cr LJ 741 (Mad)

[2] WJ Phillips v Emperor AIR 1935 Oudh 506

[3] Vedavalli v MC Ramaswamy AIR 1964 Mys 280

[4] AS Puri v KC Ahuja AIR 1970 Del 214, (1970) Cr LJ 1441 (Del)

[5] Brij Lal Bishnoi v State (1996) Cr LJ 4286 (Del)


[6] Re CS Subramaniam AIR 1953 Mad 422

[7] Pothi Gollari v Ghani Mondal AIR 1963 Ori 60, (1963) Cr LJ 312 (Ori)

[8] State of Rajasthan v Bhanwaria AIR 1965 Raj 191, (1965) Cr LJ 673 (Raj)

[9] The term "connivance" implies knowledge of, and acquiescence in the act. Toleration of the extramarital relation of his wife by the husband also amounts to connivance. It is not merely negligence or inattention but a voluntary blindness to the intimacy. Connivance of the husband is made necessary, for the offence of adultery is intended to preserve his bed unsullied, and if he elected otherwise, the law cannot help him against himself.

[10] Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State, AIR 1951 Bom 470

[11] 2011 STPL(Web) 1023 SC

[12] AIR 1988 SC 835

[13]1958 SCR 1410 : AIR 1958 SC 0441

[14] AIR 2001 SC 1285 : 2001(2)SCR 491 : 2001(4) SCC 125 : 2001(2) SCALE 514 : 2001(3) JT 620

[15] Article 14 mandates the State not to deny any person equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It mandates that every law that the State passes shall operate equally upon all persons. While Article 15, inter alia, prohibits the State from making discrimination on grounds only of sex

[16] Yusuf Abdul Aziz vs The State Of Bombay 1954 AIR 321, 1954 SCR 930

[17] Yusuf Abdul Aziz vs The State Of Bombay 1954 AIR 321, 1954 SCR 930

[18] 1985 AIR 1618, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 741

[19] 1985 AIR 1618, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 741

[20] V. Revathi vs Union Of India & Ors, 1988 AIR 835, 1988 SCR (3) 73